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Concerns on market power conferred by airport dominance and the debates of 
hub premiums have attracted longstanding attention from governments and 
academics alike.  Most previous studies mainly focus on the fully deregulated 
markets such as the United States and Europe, what remains unknown is how 
such effects change when a country evolves from a tightly controlled regime to 
a deregulated market.   
 
This research analyses the effects of airport dominance on airline pricing power 
with the empirical study based on the Chinese domestic market using fixed-
effect panel data models.  Results from the regression analysis indicate that 
airport dominance is the most important source of pricing power in the gradually 
deregulated Chinese domestic market.  Hub carriers are able to charge higher 
prices to premium class passengers and non-hub carriers can benefit from the 
“umbrella effects” of hub premiums.  However, hub carriers are not able to 
translate their airport dominance to pricing power in the economy class market, 
whereas non-hub carriers even have to reduce the prices as their market 
shares at major airports increase. This study contributes to the literature by 
explicitly segmenting the market into economy and premium classes.  The 
results have important policy implications.    
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Historically, airlines were tightly regulated throughout the world based on the 
Chicago Convention 1944 and series of bilateral air service agreements.  Air 
carriers could not compete on the basis of price since the fares charged by 
them were regulated by authorities and governments around the world 
(Narodick, 1972). The watershed event was the enactment of the Airline 
Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 in the United States (US).  After the ADA went 
into effect, airlines in the US have been given complete freedom to enter into or 
exit from any domestic routes without restrictions. Additionally, the flight 
frequency, the number of seats offered in the market, the airfares charged and 
the seats allocation of each airfare class on a particular flight can also be 
determined by each airline itself (Odoni, in Belobaba, 2009).   
 
To match the growing trend of deregulation, the European Union (EU) launched 
Three Aviation Liberalisation Packages which took ten years from 1987 to 1997 
to gradually liberalise the aviation market of Member States.  Full cabotage was 
implemented on 1 April 1997, since then all nine freedoms1 were allowed for EU 
carriers within the EU market (plus Norway and Iceland) (Button and Stough, 
2000; Chang and Williams, 2001).  Consequently, the EU became the most 
liberalised region in the world.  Any airline with a valid Air Operators Certificate 
can operate within the EU at market-determined prices (Gillen and Lall, 2004).  
In addition, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 extended the Single Market to 
ten new member states.  
 
                                            
1
 The definitions of nine freedoms are described in Appendix A 
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In China, the airline industry used to be heavily regulated:  all aspects of the 
industry such as market entry, route entry, the frequency, fare levels and aircraft 
purchasing were tightly controlled by the Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) (Zhang and Chen, 2003).  Since 1997, China’s airline industry started 
to enter into a period of deregulation, consolidation and privatisation.  In 2002, 
nine CAAC-controlled airlines were consolidated into three groups around Air 
China, China Eastern and China Southern.  In 2004, the market was partially 
deregulated with the establishment of five privately owned airlines.  By the end 
of 2008, 14 new scheduled passenger airlines were established (Lei and 
O’Connell, 2011).  By 2012, the domestic market has been greatly opened up; 
airlines have gained much greater freedom in route entry, and are able to set 
the price at the market-determined level. 
 
Aviation deregulation in the US, Europe and China saw the explosion of airline 
mergers which have resulted in the increase in the market share of individual 
airlines at the airports, especially those major airlines at their hub airports.  This 
has raised the concerns as to whether high concentration 2  would lead to 
substantial monopoly power in the airline industry.  How does airport 
dominance3. affect an airline’s pricing power?  The answer to this question is 
critical to regulators as well as practitioners in the air transport industry.  
Borenstein (1989) argued that price premiums are derived from domination and 
concentration at both airport and route market levels.  However, the studies by 
Evans and Kessides (1993) and Hofer et al (2008) concluded that substantial 
pricing power is likely to be conferred by airport-related drivers more than route-
related drivers.  So far, most studies on airport dominance either focus on the 
                                            
2
 Market concentration is the extent to which a relatively small number of firms account for a relatively 
large percentage of the market.  It is a useful economic tool which reflects the degree of competition in the 
market.   
3
 As to airline industry, market dominance conventionally refers to the airline having the largest market 
share at an airport or on a route, both in absolute and relative (compared to the second one) terms. 
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entire airport network (Borenstein, 1989; Abramowit and Brown, 1993), or on 
hub-to-hub markets (e.g. Vowles, 2006).  It is not well understood whether 
dominating a hub airport has the same effect on airline pricing as dominating an 
airport which is not operated as a hub for the focal airline (hereafter termed 
“non-hub airport”).  Another gap in the literature is that few studies have 
explicitly examined the relationship between airport dominance and prices from 
the market segment perspective. It is well known that passenger mix is an 
important factor affecting hub premiums (Lee & Luengo-Prado, 2005), and hub 
premiums are mainly contributed by relatively price-inelastic business travellers 
(Berry et al., 1996), however, no published studies have quantified the effects of 
airport dominance on airline pricing behaviours in these two distinctly different 
market segments, i.e. economy class market and premium class market. 
 
1.2 Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the effects of airport dominance on airline 
pricing power in the Chinese domestic market.  More specifically, this study 
aims to develop fixed-effect panel data models to assess the impact of airport 
dominance on airline pricing power and to ascertain whether there are hub 
premiums in the Chinese domestic market.  The reason to choose China as a 
case study is because previous work mainly focuses on the fully deregulated 
markets such as the US and Europe, where airlines dominating a market and 
operating in concentrated, oligopolistic markets may earn substantial premiums; 
what remains unknown is how such effects change when a country evolves 
from a tightly controlled regime to a deregulated market.  China represents an 
interesting case.  It has experienced exponential growth in air traffic with an 
average growth rate of 17% per annum since 1978.  By 2005, China has 
become the second largest aviation market in the world, only behind the US.  
Using China as a case study, thus, provides much needed insights into this fast 
growing market in a transition economy.  
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 outlines the 
previous studies on airport dominance and hub premiums. Chapter 3 provides 
background information regarding the deregulation and consolidation in the 
Chinese domestic market.  Chapter 4 summarizes the methods and data used 
for this study and discusses the econometric issues.  Chapter 5 presents the 




Chapter 2  Airport Dominance and Airline Pricing Power 
 
Since the deregulation of the US domestic aviation market in 1978, concerns on 
market power in the airline industry have attracted longstanding attention from 
governments and academics alike.  A potential source of market power is 
derived from major carriers’ move from “point-to-point” service to “hub-and-
spoke” operation.  Such shift has increased the level of market concentration at 
hub airports, hence, “hub premiums” have become one of the most debated 
topics in the airline industry.  This chapter reviews the literature regarding airline 
pricing power and hub premiums.  Section 2.1 discusses the determinants of 
airline pricing.  Section 2.2 looks into the airline market power and hub 
premiums.  Section 2.3 reviews some empirical studies in the European market 
in addition to the literature based on the US market.  Finally, Section 2.4 
summaries this chapter. 
 
2.1 Determinants of Airline Pricing 
Bailey and Panzar (1981) were among the first to develop price equations to 
assess the effects of competition on fares.  Since then, many studies have 
employed price equations to examine price determinants in the airline industry.  
These studies include those that focused on the effects of market structure on 
airline pricing (Kim and Singal 1993; Leahy 1994); the effects of hub-and-spoke 
networks on pricing (Brueckner et al. 1992; Vowles, 2006); the effects of the 
low-cost carriers competition on pricing (Hofer et al., 2008); and the effects of 
airline alliances on pricing (Brueckner and Whalen 2000; Brueckner 2003).  In 
these studies, the price equation, which is estimated without knowing actual 
cost information, is regarded as a reduced-form derived from a structural model.  
The implicit cost information is inferred from cross-sectional variations in prices 
and product attributes (Bresnahan, 1989).  Technically, a reduced-form price 
equation is considered to be derived from a system of equations representing 
cost (thus supply) and demand at the market clearing equilibrium condition, 
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where the market refers to air-passenger route market.  Generally, the supply 
factors include frequency, aircraft size, load factor, route characteristics (e.g. 
non-stop or connecting route) and distance.  The variables measuring demand 
side include income, population, tourist or business travellers orientation of the 
origin and destination cites and other market characteristics (e.g., hub airport, 
slot-controlled airport, and multiple airports)  (Chi and Koo, 2009). 
 
In addition to supply and demand factors, it is found that market structure plays 
an important role to determine the airfares.  Key variables include market 
dominance, market concentration and airline competition (e.g., low-cost carrier 
(LCC) competition, full-service airlines (FSA) competition).  Several studies 
demonstrated that airfares are higher in more concentrated markets (e.g. 
Granham, Kaplan and Sibley, 1983).  Moreover, Borenstein (1989) showed that 
market share of single carrier will contribute to its market power which is not 
shared by other carriers in the same market.  A variety of studies have shown 
that the contestability hypothesis which states that the presence of competition 
is unimportant in fare determinant if the market allows free entry and exit (see 
Bailey and Panzar, 1981), does not appear to hold for the airline industry. 
 
2.2 Airline Market Power and Hub Premiums 
As discussed previously, it is generally believed that market dominance and 
market concentration are the main sources of airlines’ market power.  
Numerous studies found that airlines dominating a hub airport are capable of 
exercising market power, charging higher prices to passengers, which is so 
called “hub premiums” phenomenon (e.g. Levine, 1987; Borenstein, 1989; Berry, 
1990; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Morrison and Winston, 1995; Berry et al., 
1996; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; Chi and Koo, 2009).  Having said that, it is 
worth highlighting the facts that the definitions, or measures, of “hub premiums” 
are not consistent across a variety of studies.  In some early studies, hub 
premiums refer to the mark-ups of average fare at a concentrated hub airport 
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comparing to average fare at un-concentrated airports (e.g. GAO, 1990; DOT, 
1990).  Whereas, in other studies, the hub premiums refer to price mark-ups 
charged by the dominant airline as opposed to other airlines without airport 
dominance.  An illustration of hub premium components by Hofer et al. (2004) 
visualizes the different levels of definition as shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 Illustrative components of hub premiums 
 
Source:  Hofer et al. (2004)  
 
The literature on hub premiums has continuously evolved in the past few 
decades.  These studies have provided us with comprehensive understanding 
of how various market forces interact in determining airline pricing.  The 
literature is structured into three sub-sections based on the different stages of 
understanding of the phenomenon of hub premiums.  Each stage is discussed 
in detail in this Section. 
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2.2.1 Stage I:  Testing the theory of contestable markets 
Extensive investigation of the effects of market structure on airfares has started 
by testing the market contestability hypothesis.  The observed trend towards 
concentration immediately raised policy concerns on the industry's tightening 
structure of supply and the potentially consequent negative effects for market 
performance.  In economics, the concept of contestable market refers to a 
market served by a small number of firms that behave competitively because of 
the existence of potential new entrants (Baumol, 1982).  The contestable 
market theory holds that even in the situation of monopoly or oligopoly, the 
incumbent firms will behave in a competitive manner when there is a lack of 
barriers, such as government regulation and high entry costs, to prevent new 
entrants from penetrating the market, leading the market to be characterized by 
competitive equilibria.  A perfectly contestable market has three main features - 
no entry or exit barriers, no sunk costs, and the access to the same level of 
technology. 
 
Several studies believed that the inherent competitiveness of the airline industry, 
right after deregulation, suggested that the airline market exhibited a high 
degree of contestability (Bailey and Panzar, 1981; Bailey and Baumol, 1984). If 
the idea of perfect contestability holds, the concentration should have no effects 
on airfares, because the price would already be at their competitive levels, 
equalling the marginal costs.  The views are justified by the assertion that under 
deregulation, airline entry and exit are characterized by relatively low costs. 
Hence the threat of potential competition could put pressure on the exercise of 
market power by the incumbent carriers.  Moreover, few of the costs are sunk, 
because aircrafts can easily be redeployed from one route to another.   
 
However, an econometric analysis using the fare data in late 1980 and early 
1981 by Graham et al. (1983) rejected the hypothesis that fares are 
independent of market concentration.  Shepherd (1984) questioned the 
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assumption of “ultra-free entry” and challenged its applicability in the airline 
industry.  Morrison and Winston (1986) also suggested that perfect 
contestability is not present in the airline industry because carriers require time 
and must absorb sunk costs to obtain gate space and establish patronage 
which is particularly difficult when competing against carriers that offer frequent-
flier programs (FFPs).  By the end of 1980s, it has widely recognised that 
perfect contestability theory does not hold for airline pricing. There is convincing 
evidence that the airline industry has substantial barriers to entry on account of 
the existence of a variety of entry constraints and methods of product 
differentiation (see Graham et al., 1983; Morrison & Winston, 1987; Hurdle et al., 
1989). 
 
2.2.2 Stage II: Observing the “hub premiums” 
Graham and Kaplan (1982) were among the first to discover the phenomenon 
that “fares in monopoly markets are higher than those in relatively 
unconcentrated market”.  In 1990, the General Accounting Office’s (GAO) 
conducted a widely cited study which was the first to quantify the hub premiums.  
In this report, the yields (average revenue per passenger-mile) for trips 
originating at 15 dominated hub airports were compared to the yields at 38 
unconcentrated airports in 1988.  This simple comparative analysis concluded 
that yields at hub airports were 27.2% higher.  This study used the Department 
of Transportation Data Base 1A (DB1A), a 10% sample of all tickets originating 
in the US served by US carriers.  The database contains information on total 
price paid, carrier, origin, destination, class of travel and routing, consisting of 
millions of observations collected on a quarterly basis.  It is one of the most 
comprehensive airline ticket datasets and has been widely used by most 
studies in airline pricing.  The definition of “dominated hub” in GAO’s (1990) 
study is an airport that 60% of all enplanements were taken by one carrier, or 
85% were taken by two carriers.  Some argued that a hub should not be defined 
based on proportion of total passengers carried by an airline, but rather should 
be based on some threshold of passengers making connecting travel. 
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The US Department of Transportation (DOT) conducted a similar study in the 
same year, examining these two groups of airports while controlling for route 
distance.  The DOT’s (1990) study found an average hub premium of 18.7% for 
airports dominated by one airline, and the premium of 8.9% for airports 
dominated by two airlines.  The definition of a concentrated hub is an airport 
with more than 75% of enplanements controlled by one carrier, which is 
different from that of the GAO study (1990). 
 
However, the methodology employed by the GAO (1990) appears to be too 
simplistic.  It implicitly assumed that trips taken from these two groups of 
airports were identical, not taking into account of flying distance, the number of 
plane changes, passenger mix (business travellers ratio), carrier identity, unit-
cost differences, and frequent flyer programmes. Similar analyses that 
controlled for some of these factors were carried out and found more modest 
levels for the hub premium (DOT, 1990; Morrison and Winston, 1995).  As 
mentioned previously, when controlling for the distance, DOT (1990) study 
indeed found a lower hub premium.  Since the US hub airports are generally 
located centrally, routes originating from hub airports are typically shorter than 
non-hub routes.  While the cost per mile is higher for shorter routes because the 
fixed costs such as landing fees do not vary with the stage-length of a flight.  
Hence a longer route can spread such fixed costs over distance.  It means that 
the observed higher fare level may be owing to the higher costs rather than 
concentration effects.  Another important factor that may impact average fares 
paid for hub market is higher proportion of business travellers with relatively 
inelastic demand.  Additionally, scarcity rents generated by limitation of slots 
and gates in congested major airports may be another source of premiums.  In 
another word, without controlling for these factors, any observed hub premiums 




Morrison and Winston (1995) updated the GAO study using similar approach 
but attempting to control for a number of other factors influencing the price. 
They compared the yields at 15 concentrated hub airports as opposed to 27 un-
concentrated airports using DB1A data from 1978 to 1993. The analysis 
revealed that hub premiums ranged from 4% to 10% between 1978 and 1993.  
Notably, they found a significantly lower hub premium of 5.2% in 1993 in 
contrast to the result of 33.4% estimated by GAO’s methodology.  The 28.2% 
deviation was decomposed into several aspects. Distance and the number of 
plane changes reduced the estimated premium by 18.6%; carrier-specific 
effects made a 4.6 % difference; correcting for FFPs and passenger mix each 
removed 2.5% off the premium respectively.  It was found that some carriers 
tended to charge higher prices not only on route originating from the hub 
airports but also for the whole network comparing to market average price level, 
thus the carrier-specific characteristics of hub carriers should be regarded as a 
service-quality premium, or brand premium, rather than the effects of 
dominance.  Similarly, higher proportion of non-stop routes originating from hub 
airports may result in higher average fare at airport level, which should reflect 
as service-quality premium as well.  In conclusion, despite the absence of 
robust econometric methods, Morrison and Winston (1995) provided very useful 
insights into the sources of hub premiums. 
 
In summary, studies at this stage focused on pooling the data for all airlines 
together to investigate the degree to which average fares differed at hubs 
versus at other airports.  However, they made no distinction between 
dominance and concentration effects.  Also, the different impacts from airport-
related and route-related drivers were still ambiguous.  This led researchers to 
employ more sophisticated econometric models and more comprehensive 




2.2.3 Stage III: Disentangling the sources of market power 
Hofer et al. (2008) argued that the monopoly rents of airlines stem from different 
drivers.  First, there is a need to distinguish airport-related and route-related 
drivers of pricing power.  Moreover, market dominance and market 
concentration should be treated as two different dimensions of oligopolistic 
competition.  Studies at this stage focus on comparing the prices of a network 
carrier's hub markets versus the prices of all other airlines in otherwise similar 
markets. The purpose is to distinguish route and airport characteristics as 
sources of potential pricing power by controlling for structural differences 
between these two types of markets. 
 
Borenstein (1989) was one of the first authors using sophisticated econometric 
approach to estimate the effects of route and airport dominance and 
concentration on prices.  His work is regarded as one of the most influential 
studies in hub premium debates.  He found that the dominance and 
concentration at the route level as well as at the airport level are principal 
determinants of price premiums of an airline, after controlling for a number of 
variables, such as flight frequency, distance, numbers of stops, unit-costs, 
carrier identity and airport constraints.  He argued that frequent-flyer programs 
(FFPs), travel agent commission override programs (TACOs), and corporate 
discount programs (CDPs) are the main causes of hub premiums.  Control of 
scarce resources like gates and slots by incumbent airlines is also an entry 
barrier for new entrants.  It is worthy noticing that Borenstein’s (1989) definition 
of hub premiums differs from those in the aforementioned studies.  Basically, 
Borenstein (1989) estimated the hub premium charged by the dominant airline 
relative to airlines without airport dominance, while the previous studies 
estimated the degree to which the average fare at a concentrated hub airport 




Additional evidence on hub premiums was provided by Evans and Kessides 
(1993) who concluded that the effects of competitiveness on price are more 
associated with airport characteristics rather than route features. After 
controlling inter-route heterogeneity in price which has been omitted in 
Borenstein’s (1989) study, Evans and Kessides (1993) estimated a reduced 
form fixed-effect price model. They found that substantial pricing mark-ups are 
derived from an airline’s dominance at an airport rather than at the route level. 
They further revealed that the airline’s perceived pricing power at route level is 
actually conveyed through its control of airport.  Airport and route concentration 
also plays a role in explaining price premiums but the effects are relatively small 
compared to airport dominance.  Their findings are partially supported by Hofer 
et al. (2008) who confirmed that airport market share and airport concentration 
contribute to largest part of price premiums while the impacts of route market 
share and concentration on price are much smaller. 
 
A limitation associated with the above studies is that the different market 
segments of economy and premium class have not been separated. The reason 
is probably due to the lack of reliable data.  Most of the empirical studies on 
pricing behaviour in the US airline industry have been conducted relying on the 
US DOT’s Origin and Destination Survey, which is a 10% random sample of all 
tickets that originate in the US and on US carriers.  Most researchers prefer to 
use restricted coach fare because the premium fare classification is defined by 
carriers and may not follow the same standard.  Moreover, some apparent 
mistakes occur in premium fare data. For instance, JetBlue as a low-cost 
carriers report all their tickets as first-class.  Borenstein (1989) attempted to 
analyse the pricing effects focusing on different market segments by examining 
the 20th, 50th and 80th percentile fares.  However, the proportion of leisure and 
business travellers may vary widely across markets, thus the same percentile 
fare may represent different passenger mix across various markets.  For 
instance, the 80th percentile fare may represent business passengers in some 
markets whereas leisure traveller in others.  Hence, aggregating the same 
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percentile fare data may risk from mixing the effects for different market 
segments.  Despite problems in the data, Borenstein (1989) still found that 
airport market share has more profound impact on the high priced market than 
on the low priced market. 
 
Because of data constraints, it is unfeasible to test the pricing effects of different 
cabin classes on airport dominance using reduced-form price equation.  Berry 
et al. (1996) developed a utility function based on discrete choice model of 
demand, to estimate the differential willingness to pay for different air travel 
features of leisure and business travellers.  Their results are consistent with the 
existence of two very distinct types of passengers. One is with normal attributes 
of a leisure traveller, which is high price sensitivity, low willingness to pay for 
frequent flyer features, low willingness to pay for high frequency, and low 
disutility from connecting flights.  The other is with strong business traveller 
flavour, which is just opposite of the former.  These estimates are the key to 
uncover the ability of hub carriers to increase their mark-ups in hub originating 
flights.  They concluded that the dominant hub carrier’s ability to charge higher 
fares is restricted to the tickets that appeal to relatively price-inelastic business 
travellers, who favour the origin-hub airline, and are willing to pay an average 
premium of 20%.  However, these high prices do not provide a “monopoly 
umbrella” to other non-hub airlines.  
 
Similar conclusions were obtained by Lee and Leungo-Prado (2005). They used 
the fare data of different cabin classes, namely, restricted coach fares and 
premium fares. The premium fare group in their study includes 82% unrestricted 
coach fare and 18% business and first-class fare.  They found that some 
carriers extract additional hub premiums from premium fare class passengers.  
After controlling for passenger mix, the average hub premium at major US hubs 
is reduced.  However, instead of developing separate models for these two 
different markets, they only used premier dummy variable to capture the effects 
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of passenger mix.  In doing so, they failed to measure the effects of airport 
dominance on pricing in these two distinctive market segments.   
 
There are some other studies attempting to control for various factors affecting 
airfares.  The Air Transportation Association study (Simat, Helliesen, and 
Eichner, 1989) examined the factors determining fares, with an emphasis on 
concentration, using data from 30 hub airports and 30 non-hub airports.  Their 
estimation results are in contradiction to most previous studies of airline pricing 
in that concentration have no significant impact on fares.  However, Abunassar 
and Koford (1994) criticised that the regression model in the above study was 
mis-specified as a number of important variables have not been included into 
the model.  Furthermore, there is evidence of multicolinearity which cast doubts 
on the validity of the results.  Abunassar and Koford (1994) then estimated a 
revised version of the regression model that corrected for those problems.  
Their estimation indicated that dominance of an airport resulted in a 10% higher 
fares, relative to the un-concentrated airports.   
 
In addition to the conventional approach that examines the hub premiums by 
evaluating absolute fares paid, an alternative approach was adopted by some 
other studies, comparing the differences in market share or yields on flight to 
and from a hub to test for the impact of airport dominance.  Borenstein (1990) 
showed that an airline with a dominant position at an airport has a larger share 
of the overall originating traffic, and thereby also has a larger share of any 
market originating at the dominated hub. A similar methodology was employed 
by Dresner and Windle (1992).  They controlled for distance and airport-level 
characteristics when comparing yields on flights that originate from hubs to 
yields on flights that are destined to hubs.  They found that flights from a hub 
have higher yields than those to a hub. 
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Before moving to the next Section, one more issue regarding the evolution of 
literature should be mentioned is that LCCs are found to play an important role 
in reducing hub premiums in the US domestic market.  A number of studies 
assessed the extent to which LCCs affect the network carrier’s ability to 
exercise their market power (e.g. Morrison, 2001; Hofer and Dresner, 2008; 
Brueckner et al., 2013).  However, LCC competition is very limited on hub 
originating routes in the Chinese domestic market.  Hence, the review of 
literature on the effects of LCCs’ on hub premiums is not included in this thesis.  
 
2.3 Empirical Studies for European Market 
The literature review discussed previously was completely based on the US 
domestic market, however, as Tretheway and Kincaid (2005) pointed out that 
results obtained from the US studies cannot be simply extended to other 
markets.  Considering the varied market structure characteristics, different 
progress of deregulation, diverse policy environments of the airline markets 
throughout the world, it would be worthwhile to examine whether the findings 
would apply elsewhere. 
 
Apart from China - the market on which my empirical research is based, Europe 
also plays an important role in the global airline industry in terms of is its size.  
In contrast to the ‘big bang’ style deregulation of the airline market in the US, 
liberalization in the EU took 10 years to complete, as a result of three “packages” 
of measures in 1987, 1990 and 1992, respectively. The initial deregulation of 
fare came with the first package in 1987 and all remaining restrictions on 
designation, market access and capacity were removed for intra-EU flights 
following the implementation of the third package (Odoni, in Belobaba, 2009).  
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Marin (1995) was considered to be one of the first authors to discuss the hub 
premium issue in the European context.  He analysed the impact of liberal 
bilateral agreements on several European air routes in terms of price 
competition and market structure by estimating a market share model and a 
price model in a regulated environment (all routes in 1982 and some routes in 
1989) and a deregulated environment (some routes in 1989).  He suggested 
that for European markets, airport dominance effect on airfare is absent in 
regulated environments, and is significantly negative on deregulated routes, 
which is opposite to the findings in the US.  The negative effects of airport 
dominance on price indicate that European carriers tend to exploit the cost 
reducing effect of airport presence in order to compete in prices.  The difference 
between this result and previous US studies may be explained by the significant 
differences in market power related factors.  For example, during the sample 
period of Marin (1995)’s study, Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs) were 
shared by multiple European carriers while belonging to individual single carrier 
in the US.  Moreover, FFPs almost did not exist in Europe and the hub-and-
spoke system had not yet prevailed as it had in the US.  As a result, hub 
carriers in Europe may find it difficult to improve the perceived quality and 
exercise market power through airport dominance.  
Following the implementation of the three packages, Lijesen et al. (2001) 
examined the hub premium of European carriers by relating airfares to distance, 
route HHI, and a few airline dummies using unrestricted economy class fare 
data in February 2000 obtained from internet webpages of Travelocity.  Sample 
data included ten European origins, with eight of them being the inter-
continental hubs for their home carriers.  The results revealed that price mark-
ups existed on flights to or from hub airport.  The average fares of Lufthansa, 
Air France and Swissair were 15% higher than other airlines in the sample, 
everything else being equal.  At least some of these premiums can be attributed 
to market power.  These findings are consistent with those found in the US 
domestic market.  However, the study by Lijesen et al. (2001) suffers from 
serious data deficiency.  Fare data obtained from internet websites such as 
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Travelocity were not representative of the average fares as the authors had no 
knowledge as to how many tickets were sold at given prices.  It is well known in 
the airline industry that airlines frequently change the prices to balance supply 
and demand.  Furthermore, Lijesen et al (2000) failed to control for a lot of other 
factors such as airport dominance and concentration, population and income at 
endpoint cities; all these factors are likely to have significant effects on airfares.  
 
Giaume and Guillou (2004) followed Borenstein’s (1989) approach, and 
regressed the price on market structure variables including market share and 
HHI, as well as some controlled variables, for different carrier-route pairs, using 
cross-sectional data on intra-European routes.  They found that concentration 
has a significant negative effect on airfares in the EU market, which is opposite 
to the empirical results for the US market.  Guaume and Guillou (2004) 
explained the discrepancy by the differences of market structure characteristics 
of these two markets.  They argued that carriers serving the European market 
have high inequality of market share, where major airlines take up the majority 
of market share, leaving smaller carriers with no choice but to compete on 
prices.  But the results and methodology of their study were questioned by Piga 
and Bachis (2007).  One of the arguments was that LCC variable was excluded 
in the model.  Given the fact that LCCs controlled substantial market share on 
the intra-European routes, excluding this variable may lead to biased results. 
 
Piga and Bachis (2007) examined the effects of origin airport dominance as well 
as route dominance on airline pricing behaviour in the UK-Continental Europe 
market using panel data analysis.  In their study, fare data were collected from 
airlines’ websites.  Their estimation results indicated that in airport-pair route 
market, market share has significant positive relationship with airfares, but the 
conclusion does not hold for city-pair market.  Furthermore, dominating an 
airport is conducive to pricing power.  However, they found that LCCs in Europe 
tend to set higher fares in other airports rather than in their primary hubs.  Since 
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they only include dummy variable of hub airports for LCCs in the model, the hub 
dominance effects for the whole market is unable to be evaluated. 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on hub premiums in both US and 
European markets.  Research in the US in the 1980s focused on testing the 
theory of contestable markets.  A number of studies have confirmed that perfect 
contestability theory does not hold in the airline industry, and price mark-ups did 
exist given the existence of potential competition.  Then, studies moved to the 
identification of hub premiums. A number of research conducted by US 
government agencies (e.g. DoT and GAO) as well as academics (e.g. Morrison 
and Winston (1995) confirmed the existence of the phenomenon of hub 
premiums.  After that, studies at the next stage focused on disentangling the 
sources of market power making distinction between the effects of airport 
dominance and concentration as well as airport-related and airport-related 
drivers of pricing power.  Despite different methods of measurement, a variety 
of studies come to the same conclusion that airport dominance and 
concentration lead to higher airfares.  Moreover, airport dominance plays an 
important role in determining an airline’s pricing power whilst the effects of route 
dominance and market concentration are a bit controversial.  Furthermore, the 
effect of airport dominance on pricing is probably more reflected in the business 
travel market. 
 
Compared to the abundant studies on hub premiums in the US, research on this 
topic in the context of Europe is somewhat limited.  This is mainly due to the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable data.  The four studies discussed in Section 2.3 all 
suffered from data deficiency, due mainly to the inability to obtain reliable fare 
data.  Having said that, reviewing of the studies in the European market still 
provided some interesting insights into the issues of hub premiums.  Marin 
(1995) found that market dominance and concentration have negative effects 
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on airfares, which is opposite to the findings in the US domestic market.  By 
contrast, Lijesen et al (2001) revealed that hub premiums exist on flights to or 
from hub airports.  The controversial results may due to the different periods 
focused by the authors; Marin (1995) focused on the period before the full 
implementation of the third package, while the research by Lijesen et al (2001) 
was focused on the fully liberalised European aviation market. 
 
Review of the literature also reveals that there are some limitations in the 
previous studies.  First, few studies have quantified the effects of airport 
dominance on airline pricing behaviour in two distinct market segments, i.e. 
economy class market and premium class market.  Second, most of the studies 
are conducted based on the cross-sectional analysis, which may risk leading to 
biased results as this approach is incapable to control for the specific carrier-
route effects (Evans et al., 1993).  Third, most of the studies focus on the airport 
dominance effects making no distinction between hub airports and non-hub 
airports, so it remains unknown whether dominating a hub airport has the same 
effect on airline pricing as dominating a non-hub airport.  
 
In addition, the study in the context of Europe shows that when a market was 
evolving from partial to full deregulation, the pricing behaviour of airlines was 
very different.  Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship 
between those market structure factors and the airline pricing power in a market 
moving from a tightly controlled regime to a deregulated market. 
 
This thesis aims to address those limitations identified in the previous literature 
with an empirical study based on the Chinese domestic market.  Before we 
proceed to the econometric analysis, the next chapter provides an overview of 
deregulation, airline consolidation and hub airport development in China. 
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Chapter 3  Deregulation, Airline Consolidation and Hub 
Airports in China 
 
3.1 Deregulation and Airline Consolidation in China 
China has experienced exponential growth in air traffic with an average growth 
rate of 17% per annum since 1978.  By 2005, China has become the second 
largest aviation market in the world, only behind the US.  The Chinese 
government has played a major role in shaping its air transport industry amidst 
a fast transforming economy (Lei and O’Connell, 2011).  In the domestic market, 
two particularly important decisions were made: airline consolidation and 
opening up of domestic aviation market.  In 2002, nine CAAC-controlled airlines 
were consolidated into three groups around Air China, China Eastern and China 
Southern.  The consolidation resulted in a significant restructuring of the 
Chinese aviation market and created three equally sized and spatially balanced 
airline groups.  Air China, China Eastern and China Southern each has a 
primary hub in Northern China (Beijing), Eastern China (Shanghai) and 
Southern China (Guangzhou), respectively.  
 
After the 2002 airline consolidation, the Chinese government further 
deregulated the domestic market; carriers have been given great freedom on 
route entry and are able to set airfares at market determined prices.  Approval 
procedures were simplified, and applications were rarely rejected (Lei and 
O’Connelll, 2011).  As airline consolidation was completed in 2005, the CAAC 
removed its restrictions on private investment for domestic airlines.  Lei and 
O’Connell (2011) reported that by the end of 2008, the CAAC approved 14 new 
scheduled passenger airlines, with the majority of them being controlled by 
domestic private investors.  However, constraints remained as many of these 
new airlines were prohibited from serving lucrative routes which were 
dominated by the extensive route networks of the Big Three incumbents.  Still, 
the entry of the new carriers has intensified competition in the domestic market.  
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Further consolidation continued when China Eastern took over its largest rival, 
Shanghai Airlines in 2009, and Air China gained control of Shenzhen Airlines in 
2010.     
 
3.2 The Development of Major Hub Airports in China 
The noticeable consequence of airline consolidation is the development of hub-
and-spoke network by Big Three with particular efforts put on strengthening the 
dominant positions at respective hub airports.  The operation of hub-and-spoke 
networks can affect both demand and cost of airlines. Costs can go down due 
to higher traffic density in hub-and-spoke operations than in point-to-point 
services (Caves et. al., 1984).  In addition, since there are more flights available 
between the origin and destination (OD) cities over a hub-and-spoke network, 
service quality may be improved as more travellers can find a flight at their 
desired departure time. Furthermore, a hub-and-spoke network allows an airline 
to serve many additional city-pairs when new spoke routes are integrated into 
the existing network (Lei and O’Connell, 2011). Since long distance or inter-
continental travels are costly, the development of an extensive hub-and-spoke 
network is important to an airline; such a network can feed traffic from spoke 
markets in addition to local travellers at the hub city.  Another benefit of hub-
and-spoke networks is that an airline may be able to charge a higher price for 
flights out of its hubs, a benefit referred as “hub premium” in the literature (e.g. 
Borenstein, 1989; Dresner and Windle, 1992; GAO, 1990). Because of these 
benefits associated, many airlines have developed hub-and-spoke networks. Fu 
et al. (2010) noted that major US carriers strategically plan their networks to 
strengthen their dominance in existing hubs and to expand continental market 
coverage.  Such a development strategy is often achieved through airline 
mergers and acquisitions.  Consequently, network carriers often control 
substantial market shares at their hubs. 
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It is worth highlighting that in this study only direct traffic has been taken into 
account.  This is because that Chinese domestic market is dominated by direct 
flights.  Paleari et al (2010) noticed that in 2007, direct flights account for 80% of 
all seats offered in China, while it only accounts for 60% and 57% in the US and 
Europe respectively.  Furthermore, the connecting traffic ratio at Shanghai 
Pudong Airport (PVG) and Guangzhou Baiyun Airport (CAN) was only 7% and 
4%, respectively (Fu et al, 2012).  Therefore, focusing on the direct traffic data 
captures the main features of the Chinese domestic market.  Another reason to 
focus on the direct traffic is due to the fact that the main purpose of major 
Chinese airlines to adopt hub-and-spoke network is to strengthen their 
international operations (Fu et al., 2012).  Major airlines in China do not intend 
to combine traffic to and from spoke airports via connection at hubs and thereby 
link small cities to other destinations in the domestic market.  Instead, they are 
keen to consolidate the traffic at hubs to feed their oversea routes.  In another 
word, the hub airports in China are positioned as international hubs rather than 
domestic hubs.  Hence, to study hub premiums in the Chinese domestic market, 
there is a need to focus on the direct traffic.   
 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the domestic network of Air China (CA) in 2002, 2007 and 
2012.  It can be seen that the hub status of PEK has been strengthened over 
time with a growing number of destinations linked to the hub.  Comparing the 
CA’s network in 2007 with 2002, it can be found that CA expanded its network 
to the southwest China following its acquisition of China Southwest Airlines.  By 
2012, Air China has developed extensive network from its primary hub at PEK 
(Beijing) covering economically prosperous Eastern regions and major cities in 
Western China. 
 
Figure 3-1 Domestic network of Air China (CA) in 2002 (Upper left), 2007 (Upper 
right) and 2012 (Bottom) 
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Source:  The author, compiled from the OAG database. 
 
Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK) is now the second largest airport by 
passenger numbers in the world while Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport 
(CAN), Shanghai Pudong International Airport (PVG) and Shanghai Hongqiao 
International Airport (SHA) are all among the world’s top airports in terms of 




Figure 3-2 Airport market share of the Big Three at their primary hubs: 2002-2012  
 
Notes:  
1) CA=Air China; MU=China Eastern Airlines; CZ=China Southern 
Airlines; PEK=Beijing Capital International Airport; PVG=Shanghai 
Pudong International Airport; SHA=Shanghai Hongqiao International 
Airport; CAN=Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport 
2) The calculation of the market share is based on seat capacity 
3) The merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines was 
completed in June 2010, hence the market share for China Eastern 
after 2010Q3 at PVG and SHA include the combined market shares of 
both airlines. 
Source: The author, compiled from the OAG Database 
 
Figure 3-2 shows the airport market share by capacity of Big Three at their 
primary hubs.  As it can be seen, in 2002, Air China controlled 33.6% of share 
at PEK, while China Southern was responsible for 48.1% of the market at CAN.  
Following 2002 consolidation, both airlines have gradually strengthened their 
dominant positions and the market shares were increased to 41.9% for Air 
China at PEK and 50.8% for China Southern at CAN in 2012.  Compared to the 
relatively modest increase in the market share of Air China and China Southern, 
















2002, China Eastern’s market shares at its two Shanghai hubs were relatively 
low: 28.6% at PVG and 32.3% at SHA.  This was probably due to fierce 
competition posed by another Shanghai based airline – Shanghai Airline.  
Following 2002 airline consolidation, China Eastern’s market shares at PVG 
and SHA were increased to 34.2%, and 41.2% in 2005, respectively.  The 
acquisition of Shanghai Airlines in 2009 further boosted China Eastern’s 
presence at its hub airports, gaining 47.2% share at PVG and 56.5% at SHA in 
2012.  In sum, consolidation has greatly increased the market share of Big 
Three at their hub airports. 
 
However, compared with their counterparts in the US where the majors 
generally controlled 60-75% of the market at the hub airports, the market share 
of Chinese major carriers are still relatively low.  This is probably due to the fact 
that airlines and airports are deeply integrated in the US (Fu et al, 2011) while in 
China, airlines are not allowed to hold greater than 25% stake in an airport.  The 
intention of such regulation in China is to limit airlines’ anti-competitive 
behaviour resulting from airport ownership.  It is not surprising to see that hub 
airports in China provide favourable terms to non-hub carriers.  For instance, 
with the support of Beijing airport, China Southern has exclusively occupied and 
operated Terminal 1 since September 2004.  At the same time, Hainan Airlines 
and Shenzhen Airlines gained a solid foothold at China Sothern’s hub airport at 
Guangzhou (CAN).  Given that different types of airline-airport relationships in 
China as opposed to the US, it is rather uncertain whether hub carriers in China 
are able to replicate the success of their US counterparts to translate their 
airport dominance into pricing power at the route level. 
 
Figure 3-3 shows that the HHI at the major airports initially increased after the 
2002 airline consolidation and then gradually declined following the opening up 
of the domestic market in 2005 with the exception of PEK which saw its HHI 
relatively stable from 2008 to 2012.  Clearly, the evolution of HHI at the four 
major airports followed a different pattern from that of market shares because 
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concentration is determined by not only the largest firm but also the market 
share distribution of all the market players.  This justifies the need to separate 
the effects of market share and concentration when studying airline pricing 
power. 
 
Figure 3-3 HHI of four Major Airports in China: 2002-2012  
 
Notes:  
1) PEK=Beijing Capital International Airport; PVG=Shanghai Pudong 
International Airport; SHA=Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport; 
CAN=Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport 
2) The calculation of HHI is based on seat capacity 
3) The merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines was 
completed in June 2010, hence the market share for China Eastern 
after 2010Q3 at PVG and SHA include the combined market shares of 
both airlines. 
Source: The author, complied from the OAG Database 
 
Another important feature of hub airport market is the composition of passenger 
mix.  Table 3-1 compares the relative percentage of premium passengers 
carried by the major carriers at their respective hub against the hub airport 










2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
CAN PEK PVG SHA
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than the average of the airports.  The results seem to suggest that the hub 
carriers are more attractive for premium passengers than other carriers who 
also provide premium products in the same markets.  
 
Table 3-1 Premium passenger percentage comparison between hub carrier 
and hub airport average level 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CA at PEK 57.6% 68.6% 72.4% 82.9% 65.4% 106.2% 60.0% 67.4% -3.3% 20.2% 30.9% 
MU at PVG 93.8% 18.0% 22.1% 29.8% 36.0% 15.3% -5.8% -5.4% 37.7% 35.4% 26.8% 
MU at SHA 19.9% 30.0% 35.6% 35.3% 33.5% 45.6% 49.5% 18.0% -52.2% 32.9% 38.7% 
CZ at CAN 57.5% 52.6% 47.8% 24.1% 27.7% 31.4% 38.8% 9.4% -56.5% 18.1% 26.2% 
Notes:  
1) 1) CA=Air China; MU=China Eastern Airlines; CZ=China Southern 
Airlines; PEK=Beijing Capital International Airport; PVG=Shanghai 
Pudong International Airport; SHA=Shanghai Hongqiao International 
Airport; CAN=Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport 
2) Percentage of premium passenger is calculated by the number of 
premium passengers divided by total passengers; relative percentage 
is calculated by the difference of percentage between the hub carrier 
and the hub airport average level, divided by the percentage of hub 
airport 
Source:  The author, compiled from Sabre ADI Database 
 
Table 3-2 and 3-3 compare average fare per mile (in CNY/mile) for hub carriers 
and non-hub carriers at the four primary airports in the third quarter of 2002 and 
2012 respectively.  The results in the economy fare class show that in 2002, the 
average yields of hub carriers were lower than non-hub carriers at CAN and 
PEK for all markets. When the market is segmented by distance, different 
pictures have emerged.  In general, the average yields of hub carriers were 
lower than those of non-hub carriers in the short haul markets, i.e. distance less 
than 1000 miles.  However, hub carriers were able to charge higher prices on 
routes with distances longer than 1000 miles.  This is probably because long-
haul routes are more likely to be dominated by major airlines, hence inducing 
higher prices.  Nevertheless, by 2012, fares charged by the hub carriers were 
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higher or similar as those charged by non-hub carriers in almost all flight 
distance segments.  In terms of the average yields regardless of the distance, it 
has become evident that the prices charged by hub carriers were higher than 
non-hub carriers at all four hub airports.  These results seem to suggest that 
hub premiums exist in China as dominant airlines’ increases their market shares 
at hub airports.   
 
In the premium fare market, hub carriers’ average yields were higher than those 
of non-hub carriers at all hub airports, except for China Southern (CZ) at CAN in 
both 2002 and2012.  The consistent results seem to indicate that the 
phenomenon of hub premiums is more significant in the premium market as 
opposed to the economy market.  When the premium markets are segmented 
by distance, some mixed results have emerged.  For example, at PVG in 2002, 
the average yields generated by hub carrier were lower than those charged by 
non-hub carriers in the 500-1000 miles segment.  The situation was reversed in 
2012 for the same segment, though the hub carrier’s average yields were lower 
than non-hub carriers in the segments greater than 1000 miles. 
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Table 3-2 Comparisons of Average Fare per Mile (Yield) for Flights from 
Dominant Airports in 3rd Quarter, 2002 














CAN CZ 48.12%             
Hub carrier 
  
2.30  1.92  1.52  1.72  1.30  1.69  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 2.34  1.78  1.48  0.60  1.81  
Average 
  
2.30  2.11  1.67  1.57  0.83  1.76  
PEK CA 33.61%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 1.99  1.44  1.72  - 1.62  
Non-hub carrier 
  
2.52  2.08  1.66  1.47  0.75  1.66  
Average 
  
2.52  2.04  1.58  1.56  0.75  1.64  
PVG MU 28.55%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 2.04  1.88  
 
- 1.95  
Non-hub carrier 
  
5.04  2.39  1.78  1.30  - 1.87  
Average 
  
5.04  2.27  1.80  1.30  - 1.88  
SHA MU 32.29%             
Hub carrier 
  
2.87  1.84  1.80  - - 1.85  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 2.01  1.87  1.63  0.56  1.82  
Average 
  
2.87  1.96  1.85  1.63  0.56  1.83  














CAN CZ 48.12%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 2.85  2.51  2.57  2.80  2.57  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 3.94  2.64  2.55  - 2.65  
Average 
  
- 2.99  2.54  2.56  2.80  2.59  
PEK CA 33.61%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 3.49  2.67  2.66  - 2.77  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 2.56  2.73  2.47  2.00  2.66  
Average 
  
- 3.17  2.69  2.57  2.00  2.73  
PVG MU 28.55%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 2.80  2.61  - - 2.75  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 3.49  2.63  2.08  - 2.64  
Average 
  
- 2.85  2.63  2.08  - 2.69  
SHA MU 32.29%             
Hub carrier 
  
4.01  2.91  2.80  - - 2.89  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 2.89  2.64  2.10  - 2.64  
Average 
  
4.01  2.90  2.70  2.10  - 2.73  
 Note: Market share calculated by capacity. Yields are in CNY per mile. 
Source: The author, compiling from Sabre ADI Database. 
 31 
Table 3-3 Comparisons of Average Fare per Mile (Yield) for Flights from 
Dominant Airports in 3rd Quarter, 2012  














CAN CZ 50.82%             
Hub carrier 
  
2.38  1.81  1.26  1.06  0.94  1.37  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 1.65  1.26  1.06  0.96  1.30  
Average 
  
2.38  1.75  1.26  1.06  0.95  1.33  
PEK CA 41.90%             
Hub carrier 
  
2.48  2.19  1.42  1.06  1.25  1.48  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 2.02  1.39  1.05  1.19  1.40  
Average 
  
2.48  2.10  1.40  1.05  1.21  1.43  
PVG MU 47.21%             
Hub carrier 
  
3.21  1.99  1.43  1.04  0.91  1.45  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 1.58  1.47  1.04  0.90  1.35  
Average 
  
3.21  1.80  1.45  1.04  0.90  1.39  
SHA MU 56.64%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 1.72  1.36  0.98  0.91  1.41  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 1.67  1.36  1.03  0.92  1.40  
Average 
  
- 1.69  1.36  1.00  0.92  1.41  














CAN CZ 50.82%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 3.50  2.99  2.60  1.40  2.99  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 4.57  3.04  3.35  2.36  3.21  
Average 
  
- 3.63  3.01  2.98  1.52  3.07  
PEK CA 41.90%             
Hub carrier 
  
7.25  5.17  3.98  3.37  3.66  4.09  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 4.92  3.85  3.10  2.46  3.87  
Average 
  
7.25  5.06  3.92  3.25  2.96  3.99  
PVG MU 47.21%             
Hub carrier 
  
11.50  5.80  3.53  2.72  2.34  3.96  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 4.94  3.28  3.09  2.49  3.38  
Average 
  
11.50  5.58  3.39  2.92  2.43  3.67  
SHA MU 56.64%             
Hub carrier 
  
- 4.27  3.97  6.21  2.58  4.11  
Non-hub carrier 
  
- 4.77  3.65  2.60  2.55  3.72  
Average 
  
- 4.36  3.83  5.75  2.56  3.96  
 Note: Market share calculated by capacity. Yields are in CNY per mile.  
Source: The author, compiling from Sabre ADI Database. 
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3.3 Summary 
In summary, this chapter provides background information of the Chinese airline 
industry on which the empirical analysis will be based.  After a brief review of 
deregulation and airline consolidation in Chinese domestic market, the 
development of “Big Three” (CA, MU and CZ) carriers and their hub airports 
(PEK, SHA/PVG and CAN) were examined.   
 
In the past decade, the market share of the Big Three at their primary hubs has 
increased from around 30% in 2002 to more than 50% in 2012.  The HHI was 
relatively stable and was highly concentrated during the sample period.  
Moreover, it is observed that hub carriers’ premium passenger ratio was above 
average at hub airports.  A comparison of yields for flights from major airports 
between hub carriers and non-hub carriers provided preliminary evidence of 
pricing power of hub airlines due to the increased airport market share.  The 
results provide initial support for the existence of hub premiums.  However, 
when the market was segmented by distance, mixed results were emerged 
suggesting it is essential to take time period effects and distance into account in 
the econometric exercises.   
 
In the next chapter, the difference of pricing power will be formally tested by 
performing a set of fixed-effects panel data models which allow us to identify the 
effects of airport dominance on economy class fares and premium class fares, 
respectively using variation in airport market share over time within a given 
route. 
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Chapter 4  Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used for the thesis.  Instead of using 
cross sectional analysis commonly adopted by previous studies in this area, the 
fixed-effect models are employed to estimate our panel data regression models.  
Moreover, instrumental variables (IV) approach is used to deal with the 
endogeneity problem.  This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.1 
reviews key methods in panel data analysis.  Section 4.2 specifies the 
econometric model used in the empirical study and discusses the expected 
relationship between each of the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable.  Section 4.3 reports the data sources of this study and explains issues 
when constructing the database.  Section 4.4 discusses the issues of 
endogeneity and the solutions to this problem.  And Section 4.5 summarized 
this chapter. 
 
4.1 Panel Data Analysis 
4.1.1 Panel Data Analysis versus Cross Sectional Analysis 
The types of data generally used in empirical studies are time series, cross 
section and panel (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Time series data observes 
values of variables of single unit over a period of time, while cross sectional 
data focus on the values of variables collected for several sample units at the 
same point of time. Panel data could be treated as a hybrid of cross-sectional 
and time-series data (Ashley, 2012), in which a group of cross sectional units 
are observed over time, which means that there are two dimensions of data – 
individual dimension and time dimension.  
   
Panel data model – the regression model based on panel data – has become 
increasingly popular in empirical research due to its powerful capacity for 
capturing the complexity of reality – more specifically, the complexity of human 
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behaviour.  Comparing to conventional cross-sectional and time-series data 
model, there are several advantages to using panel data (see Hsiao, 2003; 
Gujarati and Porter, 2009 for details).  First, techniques of panel data estimation 
are able to control for individual heterogeneity. Panel data deal with the sample 
units like individuals, firms, states or countries, which are heterogeneous.  
Time-series and cross-section studies not controlling this will lead to bias in the 
resulting estimates.  Panel data estimation can take such heterogeneity 
explicitly into account by controlling for unit-invariant and time-invariant 
variables.  Particularly, one may effectively control for all unit-specific 
characteristics no matter whether they are observable or not when employing 
panel data analysis.   Second, panel data gives more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables by combining time series of cross-
section observations.  Third, by studying repeated cross-section observations, 
panel data are better suited to study the dynamics of adjustment.  Changes will 
be hidden by stable cross-sectional data; hence panel data enables us to 
observe the effects of policy changes if the time period is long enough. 
 
4.1.2 Estimation Techniques for Panel Data 
A panel data regression differs from a regular time-series or cross-section 
regression in that it has a double subscript on its variables, i.e. 
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with   denoting the  th individual and   denoting time.   is a scalar whereas   is 
a     matrix.       denotes  th explanatory variable for   th observation. 
 
There are several options of estimating a panel data model, depending on the 




1) Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) model 
If we pooled together all observations, assuming the regression coefficients are 
the same for all individuals, it means that there is no distinction between 
individuals, firms or countries, which is known as the overall homogeneity 
hypothesis.  Additionally, it is assumed that the explanatory variables    are 
strictly exogenous, which means that they are uncorrelated with the current, 
past and future values of the error term    .  In fact, the assumptions are always 
not grounded for many empirical studies.  Then if we ignore the heterogeneity 
among the individuals or firms, it may result in the risk that the error term may 
be correlated with some of explanatory variables.  As a consequence, the OLS 
estimation will lead to biased and inconsistent results.   
 
There are several techniques to address these problems, taking into account 
the estimation of unobserved effects. The two most prominent methods are the 
fixed-effects (FE) estimator and the random-effects (RE) estimator (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009; Hill et al., 2008; etc.).   
 
To make the description easier to understand, two-way composite error term 
(see Baltagi, 2008) is used to express the disturbances in model (4-1): 
    itti                                                       (4-2) 
Where    denotes the unobservable individual specific effect which is constant 
over time, t denotes the unobservable time effect, and  it is the remainder 
stochastic term that change over time and affect    .  Before proceeding to FE 
and RE model, it is worth pointing out that the POLS estimation is usually 
biased and inconsistent even we assume that the stochastic error it is 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables.  This is because the individual effect    
is inherently correlated with     , hence     and     is still correlated. 
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2) Fixed-effects (FE) model 
In a FE model,    are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated, and the 
stochastic error it are independent and identically distributed random 
variables.  The     is assumed to be uncorrelated with it . 
 
The FE estimator uses a transformation to wipe out the unobservable individual 
effects prior to estimation.  More precisely, for each    we firstly average the 
original equation over time, and then subtract the mean expression from original 
equation that obtain a time-demean form equation, finally estimate the 
transformed equation by OLS.  After the time-demeaned transform, the 
unobservable effect    has been removed; hence, the OLS estimation is no 
longer biased.  The fixed-effect estimator is also called within estimator, 
because the OLS estimate in the last step uses the time variation in   and   
within each cross-sectional observation. 
 
A distinctive advantage of the FE model is that it allows for correlation between 
   and     at any time period. It is an attractive approach when we focus on 
investigating a specific set of individuals or firms.  The inference, however, is 
restricted to the behaviour of the given group of individuals and over the specific 
observed time periods.  There are also some disadvantages associated with the 
FE model.  First of all, it is not able to estimate time-invariant explanatory 
variables.  Moreover, given the extensive use of dummy variables to control for 
time period and individual specific effects, FE model consumes a lot of degrees 
of freedom, thus may reduce the efficiency of estimation.  This is particularly the 
case when the number of observations is small. 
 
3) Random-effects (RE) model 
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If the time-invariant individual-specific effect    can be assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed random variables, then we can avoid 
using FE model which contains too many parameters and consumes a lot of 
degrees of freedom.  This turns out to be the random-effects (RE) model.  
 
There is an additional requirement for RE model that    is uncorrelated with 
each explanatory variable in all time periods except for all the FE model 
assumptions.  In this case,    and it are independent and identically 
distributed random variables,    and it are uncorrelated,     is uncorrelated 
with     or it for all   and    .   
 
The RE model is an appropriate specification when randomly sampling N 
individuals from a large population.  When N is large, a FE model will lead to a 
huge loss of degrees of freedom. Then one of the advantages of RE model over 
FE model is that it is more efficient, as we do not have to estimate N cross-
sectional intercepts instead of estimating the mean value of the intercept and its 
variance.  Another advantage of RE model is that the time-invariant variables 
can be introduced into the model and be estimated properly.  
 
Finally, when considering which model to choose, one should first think carefully 
from theoretical perspective to check the applicability of the properties and 
assumptions of the different techniques.  Although there is a conventional 
specification test being well known as Hausman (1978) Test, which is based on 
testing whether the estimation by FE and RE models are significantly different, 
the information it provides is limited (Hsiao,.2003).  In practice, researchers 
always interpret the rejection of the test as the support for the use of FE model 
and non-rejection as RE model.  However, the more reliable decision should be 
made based on theory.  In this study, the research focuses on all route-carrier 
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pairs in the market.  The estimation is based on the population rather than the 
sample.  The individual-specific effects are unlikely to be random.   Thus FE 
model should be an appropriate model to be adopted.  More advantages of 
using FE model will be further elaborated in the following section. 
 
4.2  Model 
4.2.1 Empirical model 
Most of the previous studies in this area were based on the analysis of cross-
sectional data which is incapable of illustrating the evolution of airport 
dominance and pricing power.  This study uses panel data and employs fixed-
effect model to control for time-invariant, route-carrier effects and estimates the 
pricing effect of airport dominance using variation in the competitiveness of a 
given route over time.  By contrast, a cross-sectional analysis estimates the 
effect of airport dominance on price using variation in the competitiveness 
across routes. This is an important difference, as pointed out in Section 4.1.1, 
identification of the effect of airport dominance on price using cross-sectional 
data is obtained only if the researcher can control for all other differences in 
price determinants across markets that are correlated with differences in market 
structure without having to explicitly measure them.  Fixed-effects panel 
analysis procedure addresses carrier-route dummies, which allows us to 
capture time-invariant characteristics specific to the carrier-route observation 
such as distance, tourist routes, and primary routes. 
 
A reduce-form pricing equation is developed where demand and supply 
characteristics of the relevant market are included as explanatory variables, 
taking into account of the airline and route characteristics, and measures of 
market structure.  Selection of variables that included in the model refers to a 
series of previous studies (e.g. Borenstein, 1989; Evans and Kessides, 1993; 





















    (4-3) 
where    indexes the carrier,    the route, and    the time period. Carrier-route 
fixed effects are represented as ij  . I control for principal exogenous cost and 
demand effects through a full set of time dummies 
t
 .  The ijte  stands for the 
random error term. 
 
One-way directional traffic data from the four hub airports to the rest of 
mainland China are used.  The purpose of such arrangements is to create two 
distinctive groups of airports with all departing airports being the four hubs and 
arrival airports being regional airports, so that the pricing effects between the 
hub and regional airports can be separated. 
 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
To investigate the pricing effects of airport dominance on economy class and 
premium class passengers, two models are specified.  Dependent variable in 
Model 1 is the average one way economy class fares, while dependent variable 
in Model 2 is the average one way premium class fares.  Fares are adjusted for 
inflation using CPI.  Data in each model are further divided into two sub-
samples with sub-sample (a) being the observations for hub carriers originating 
from their hub airports; and sub-sample (b) being other airlines. 
  
It is expected that the tickets of economy class are mainly bought by price-
sensitive passengers. Low-price strategy may be used by airlines to attract 
these passengers to spread the overhead costs and improve load factor.  By 
contrast, premium class tickets mainly target business travellers who may not to 
be sensitive to the price but are attracted by quality of service and loyalty 
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programmes.  Airport dominance may have greater power over the premium 
passengers than economy passengers. 
 
4.2.3 Market Structure Variables 
Following Hofer et al. (2008), airport dominance, airport concentration, route 
dominance and route concentration are used to measure dominance and 
concentration at the airport and route level.  The key variable which to be most 
interested in this study is airport market share, which is defined as the capacity 
share of focal airline i on route j in period t. Generally, the expected sign of 
airport market share should be positive.  An airline with a dominant share at an 
airport will obtain competitive advantages from: 1) dominant reputation acquired 
by offering most of the flights to and from the city (Borenstein, 1989); 2) control 
of scarce airport resources such as availability of slots and gates especially at 
congested airports; 3) Frequent-flyer-programs (FFPs) becomes more attractive 
because of extensive network and more often future flights expectation.  In 
summary, when an airline provides a large share of capacity at an airport, its 
attractiveness to passengers will be enhanced, hence contributing to higher 
fares.  However, airport dominance may also lead to fare reduction (Marin, 
1995).  Gaining high airport market share allows an airline to exploit the 
economies of scale.  Cost reduction may be achieved in marketing, aircraft 
maintenance and labour. Lower cost may provide airlines with room for potential 
price cut for revenue maximization.  Therefore, the sign of airport market share 
is not predetermined. 
 
HHI is a commonly used indicator to measure airport concentration. The sign for 
HHI is not clear a priori.  A dominant firm may find it more convenient and 
easier to maintain high prices if it competes against a fringe of small firms rather 
than a fairly large and well-established rival.  In the first scenario the HHI would 
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be smaller than in the second 4  and the predicted sign would be negative.    
However, holding market share constant, a higher HHI may make it more 
feasible for firms to collude, hence raising prices, which suggests a positive sign 
(Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). 
 
Instead of using weighted airport share or airport HHI of both origin and 
destination airports, this study distinguishes departure and arrival airports with 
DepShare variable representing an airline’s market share at departure airports 
and ArrShare variable for an airline’s market share at arrival airports.  In the 
same manner, HHI is also separated into DepHHI and ArrHHI.  In our dataset, 
the departure airports are the 4 major airports, while the arrival airports are the 
other airports in China.  Therefore, the DepShare variable is of most interest in 
this study which will be used to investigate the airport dominance effects. 
   
For route-related variables, I define route market share (RouteShare) as the 
capacity share provided by airline i on route j in period t while route HHI 
(RouteHHI) as the sum of the squares of route share of each airline operated on 
route j in period t.  Controlling for route concentration, higher route market 
shares is expected to be associated with higher prices.  The sign of route HHI is, 
however, ambiguous. On the one hand, fewer airlines on a concentrated route 
make it easier to collude, hence, pushing up the price. On the other hand, if a 
dominant airline on a route has an outstanding competitive advantage through 
                                            
4
 For example, assuming a dominant firm accounting for 80% of the market share:  
- Scenario 1: it competes against a fringe of small firms, like 4 companies occupying 5% of the market 
each.  Then HHI1 = (0.8
2 
+ 4 * 0.05
2
 ) * 10000 = 6500 
- Scenario 2: it competes against a fairly large and well-established rival, like a company holding 20% 




 ) * 10000 = 6800 
The HHI in the first scenario is smaller than in the second one, but it is easier for the dominant firm to 
maintain a higher price in the first scenario. 
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marketing and advertising, other airlines may respond with lower fares.  
Therefore, route HHI could be either positive or negative depending on different 
scenarios. 
 
4.2.4 Control Variables 
Three control variables are included into our models.  The first one is frequency 
(       ) which is measured by the number of scheduled flight departures on 
route j operated by airline i in period t.  As discussed in section 2.1, several 
variables of supply side could be included in the model.  Following Berry et al. 
(1996), I choose to control for flight frequencies in the model. The reason is that 
depending on demand conditions, airlines may respond to increased density by 
increasing flight frequency rather than by increasing aircraft size.  Higher 
frequency of flights is likely to reduce operating costs per passenger when 
controlling for the load factor, because high frequencies allow airlines to plan 
the schedule more flexibly, thus aircraft utilization will be generally greater 
(Doganis, 2002; Borenstein, 1989).  Frequency of service may have positive or 
negative impact on airfares depending on its effect on demand and operating 
costs (Chi & Koo, 2009).  Douglas and Miller (1974) introduced the concept of 
“schedule delay”, which has two components.  The first one is “frequency delay”, 
which represents the elapsed time between an individual traveller’s preferred 
time and the time of a scheduled flight.  The second one is called “stochastic 
delay”, which represents the additional elapsed time when preferred flights are 
fully booked.  Higher frequency lowers frequency delay, thus increasing the 
value of the product, especially for time-sensitive passengers. (Borenstein, 
1989).  More specifically, a higher frequency of flights may provide passengers 
more chances to get a ticket for their preferred schedules, as well as decreasing 
the waiting time for next flight when the reserved one is cancelled. If the 
stimulation of demand is dominant, the sign is expected to be positive, 
particularly for business oriented routes and premium class fares.  However, if 
the cost reduction effect is dominant, the sign will be negative.   
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The other two control variables are Population (     ) and Income (        ).  
Both variables are conventional indicator of potential market size, thus the 
demand factors.  Population is measured by the geometric mean of the 
endpoint city population of route j in period t.  Income is measured by the 
geometric mean of the GDP per capita of the endpoint city of route j in period t.  
Income data have been adjusted for inflation by using CPI.  Higher incomes and 
more population may affect demand thus fares by raising the propensity for air 
travel in a market.  However, these positive demand effects on fares could be 
offset through cost savings associated with higher traffic densities, which are 
realized when higher demand leads to the use of larger aircraft, thus reducing 
unit operating costs (Chi & Koo, 2009; Brueckner et al., 2013). 
 
Flight distance is also an undisputed important variable which is related to fuel 
cost and labour cost.  As the distance is time invariant, hence, cannot be 
estimated by fixed effect models, nevertheless, the effects of distance can be 
captured by carrier-route specific dummies.  Other time invariant variables 
which are captured by carrier-route specific dummies include route specific 
characteristics such as tourist oriented routes and business dominated routes. 
 
4.3 Data 
The fare data are obtained from Airport Data Intelligence (ADI) developed by 
Sabre Airline Solutions, in which the airfare and passenger data are based on 
MIDT data and adjusted to account for airline direct bookings, low-cost carriers 
and other non-MIDT distribution channels.  Compared to the DB1B database, 
the ADI data have much wider coverage.  Frequency data are exacted from ADI 
which are sourced from Innovata and OAG databases.  Population and GDP 
per capita data are obtained from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook 
for Cities and China Statistical Yearbook for regional economy.   
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The author then construct a panel in which an observation is a flight operated 
by a specific airline on a specific route (group dimension), in a specific year-
quarter period (time dimension).  For instance, a direct route from Beijing (PEK) 
to Chengdu (CTU) operated by Air China (CA) in the third quarter of 2004 is 
considered to be an observation in the dataset.  Those observations with 
frequency less than 24 flights per quarter which approximately equals to 2 
flights per week have been eliminated.  Additionally, route served by a specific 
carrier with total passengers (sum of economy and premium class) less than 
240 per quarter are excluded in the dataset5.   
 
4.4 Issues of Endogeneity 
4.4.1 Problem of endogeneity 
A critical assumption of the classical linear regression model (CLRM) is that the 
unobserved factors represented by the error term are not systematically related 
to the regressors.  Or equivalently, the expected value of the error term   , 
given the values of the regressors, is zero.  Symbolically, 
 (  |  )    (4-4) 
 
With this and the other assumptions (See Gujarati, 1999), the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimators can be established as the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE). But if the assumption fails, which means that the error term 
and one or more regressors are correlated, the OLS estimators are biased as 
well as inconsistent, even in large samples. This is known as the problem of 
endogeneity. In this situation, even if a single regressor in a multiple regression 
is stochastic or endogenous, OLS estimates for all the coefficients are 
                                            
5
  These criteria are commonly used in the literature in an effort to improve data quality. 
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inconsistent (see Gujarati, 2011, P314). Consequently, the tests of significance 
and hypothesis testing become questionable. 
 
The reasons for correlation between regressors and the error term are primarily 
represented as measurement errors in the regressor(s), omitted variable bias 
and simultaneous equation (joint determination) bias.  Ashely (2012) indicates 
that it is not possible to directly test whether or not endogeneity in the 
explanatory variables is a serious problem.  Hence in practice, whether or not 
endogeneity is present is always judged from theoretical perspective.  
 
Typically, in empirical studies, the endogeneity discussion is always related to 
the possibility of correlation between an explanatory variable and the model 
error term due to either “reverse causation” between the dependent variable 
and an explanatory variable or due to “joint determination”, where the 
dependent variable and an explanatory variable are jointly determined by a set 
of simultaneous equations.  In terms of the “revers causality” issue, which is the 
most relative cause of endogeneity problem in our study, the discussion below 
will elaborate the problem. 
 
The inherent causal relationship in a regression model should be like that:  
fluctuations in the explanatory variables cause part of the observed fluctuation 
in the dependent variable, with the remainder of them attributed to other causal 
influences which are included in the error term.  A “reverse causality” is defined 
as that if the fluctuations in an explanatory variable not only contribute to the 
sample fluctuations in the dependent variable, which is the reason why this 
variable is included in the model, but themselves are also caused by the 
fluctuations in the dependent variable.  This issue emerge in empirical study 
quite often.  The primary econometric tool for dealing with reverse causality and 
other forms of endogeneity problem is so-called instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation technique, which will be introduced in coming section. 
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4.4.2 Method of instrumental variables (IV) 
A valid instrument (always denoted by   ) is an observed variable characterized 
by two properties: 1) it should be correlated with at least one of the endogenous 
variables (instrument relevance); 2) it should be uncorrelated, at least 
asymptotically, with the error term (instrument exogeneity). 
 
The first condition is testable, because the sample correlations between    and 
the explanatory variables provide consistent estimations of the population 
correlations. By contrast, the exogeneity assumption cannot actually be tested 
in practice.  The reason is exactly the same as the reason why it is not possible 
to directly test for endogeneity: the condition involves the model errors which 
are unobservable, even for large samples.  In practice, it is always challenging 
to find specification of an apparently valid instrument for the endogenous 
variable.  Due to the use of panel data, there is a relatively easy way to find an 
instrument for the endogenous variable, which will be elaborated in next section. 
 
4.4.3 Procedures of dealing with endogeneity 
Apparently, there are concerns of potential endogeneity with a series of right-
hand-side variables in model (4-3).  In this case, a variable is endogenous if a 
change in the variable affects prices, and the prices also result in a change in 
the variable. Obviously, market share at route level is potentially correlated with 
the random error term, because offering lower price attracts more passengers 
hence allowing the airline to achieve a higher market share, that is, the route 
market share and random error term will be negatively correlated, which means 
least-square estimates of the coefficient on route market share would 
underestimate its true effect on price.  As the airline’s market share on a route 
and its size of operations at the endpoints of the route are interrelated, the 
DepShare and ArrShare are expected to be endogenous.  So are the 
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airport/route HHI that calculated by market share.  Another suspected 
endogenous variable is frequency, because lower fare will increase the demand 
of traffic, which will increase the value of frequency.  
 
To provide an unbiased estimate of the effects on price, an instrumental 
variable (IV) procedure is employed.  Following Chi and Koo’s (2009) approach, 
one-quarter lags of the endogenous variables are used as instruments in the 
model.  The variables are all expected to be closely related to their counterparts 
in the following period, which satisfy the instrument relevance requirement.  
Moreover, the instrument exogeneity requirement (identifying exclusion 
restriction) holds if an airline’s current prices do not respond to the market 
structure and capacity allocation of previous quarter. 
 
Since the use of IV estimation must be balanced against the inevitable loss of 
efficiency against using OLS, it is therefore very useful to have a test of whether 
or not OLS is inconsistent and IV is required (Baum et al., 2003). This is the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test of the endogeneity of regressors, which 
involves estimating the model via both OLS and IV approaches and comparing 
the resulting coefficient vectors.  The null hypothesis for testing is that the OLS 
estimator is consistent and fully efficient.  A rejection should be interpreted of 
the necessity of using an IV approach.  In this study, the DWH test is rejected; 
hence, the IV technique should be necessarily used. 
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter reviews key methods in panel data analysis.  A comparison of the 
estimation techniques suggests that the fixed-effect model is the most 
appropriate method for this study, because the estimation is based on the 
population rather than the sample, and the individual-specific effects which 
should be controlled are unlikely to be random.  And then the model 
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specification is thoroughly discussed along with the advantages of FE model.  
Following the formulation of the models, the expected relationship between 
each of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable was extensively 
discussed.  Data sources and the dataset structure were also presented.  
Finally, the issues of endogeneity have been discussed.  The method of 
Instrumental Variable (IV) is employed as a solution to the problems. In addition, 
the two-dimensional property of panel data enables the utilization of lagged 
variables as instruments.  It is another advantage of panel-data analysis that 
simplifies the creation of IV which is widely considered to be a serious challenge 





Chapter 5  Results and Discussions 
 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the models are reported in Table 5-
1 and Table 5-2.  In the whole sample, average fare for the premium class is 
CNY1783 (US$ 257) which is about 80% higher than that in economy class (i.e. 
CNY1081 or US$174).  Concentration at the route level is much higher than that 
at the airport level.  The mean HHI for economy and premium class at the route 
level is 5367 and 4915, respectively, indicating relatively high level of 
concentration.  Even the least concentrated route has a HHI of 1727. By 
contrast, the mean HHI for departure airports is 2498.  While HHI for the four 
hub airports fluctuated from 1378 to 3630 during the sample period year 2002 to 
2012, HHI for the arrival airports range from highly competitive market (960) to 
monopoly market (10000).  Moreover, there are large variations in terms of 
frequency, population and income, which indicate that the sample data cover 
diversified routes and the results could be generalised to a wide range of 
situations.  Table 5-2 reveals some different characteristics of the two sub-
samples. The average market share of hub carriers at the departing airports 
and the routes was much higher than that of non-hub carriers. 
Table 5-1 Descriptive Analysis for whole sample 
Whole Sample 
  Model 1 - Economy  (Observations: 21625)   Model2- Premium  (Observations: 14940) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fare 1081.27  541.89  104.07  4989.18  
 
1782.60  936.73  272.56  7921.10  
DepShare 0.2251  0.1749  0.0003  0.5661  
 
0.2581  0.1697  0.0015  0.5661  
DepHHI 0.2498  0.0435  0.1378  0.3630  
 
0.2487  0.0411  0.1378  0.3630  
ArrShare 0.2655  0.2363  0.0017  1  
 
0.2574  0.2063  0.0025  1  
ArrHHI 0.3009  0.1841  0.0960  1  
 
0.2743  0.1467  0.0960  1  
RouteShare 0.4831  0.3322  0.0117  1  
 
0.4652  0.2957  0.0117  1  
RouteHHI 0.5367  0.2734  0.1727  1  
 
0.4915  0.2460  0.1727  1  
Frequency 178.42  164.38  24 1586 
 
217.96  178.62  24 1586 
Population 756.89  325.39  83.53  2174.01  
 
775.95  323.14  90.84  2174.01  
Income 40295  13754  9860  93333    41895  13481  11518  93253  
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Table 5-2 Descriptive Analysis for sub-samples 
Hub carriers 
  Model 1a-Economy  (Observations: 7230)   Model 2a-Premium  (Observations: 6026) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fare 980.84  497.54  109.22  4344.85  
 
1723.82  931.05  272.56  7921.10  
DepShare 0.4395  0.0713  0.1900  0.5661  
 
0.4348  0.0698  0.1900  0.5661  
DepHHI 0.2572  0.0437  0.1378  0.3630  
 
0.2539  0.0424  0.1378  0.3630  
ArrShare 0.2681  0.2250  0.0050  1  
 
0.2416  0.1930  0.0050  1  
ArrHHI 0.3186  0.1887  0.0960  1  
 
0.2876  0.1521  0.0960  1  
RouteShare 0.6355  0.2937  0.0439  1  
 
0.5935  0.2783  0.0439  1  
RouteHHI 0.6133  0.2885  0.1727  1  
 
0.5622  0.2717  0.1727  1  
Frequency 226.24  206.28  24 1586 
 
255.56  212.26  24 1586 
Population 728.76  303.85  83.53  2174.01  
 
750.97  310.09  90.84  2174.01  
Income 39035  13508  11315  93253    40616  13432  11518  93253  
Non-hub carriers 
  Model 1b-Economy  (Observations: 14395)   Model 2b-Premium  (Observations: 8914) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fare 1131.71  556.07  104.07  4989.18  
 
1822.34  938.53  272.56  6829.68  
DepShare 0.1174  0.0933  0.0003  0.5606  
 
0.1386  0.0979  0.0015  0.5606  
DepHHI 0.2460  0.0429  0.1378  0.3630  
 
0.2452  0.0398  0.1378  0.3630  
ArrShare 0.2641  0.2418  0.0017  1  
 
0.2680  0.2142  0.0025  1  
ArrHHI 0.2920  0.1811  0.0960  1  
 
0.2652  0.1422  0.0960  1  
RouteShare 0.4066  0.3240  0.0117  1  
 
0.3785  0.2749  0.0117  1  
RouteHHI 0.4982  0.2570  0.1727  1  
 
0.4436  0.2142  0.1727  1  
Frequency 154.41  132.28  24 1009 
 
192.54  146.35  24 1009 
Population 771.02  334.81  83.53  2174.01  
 
792.83  330.62  90.84  2174.01  
Income 40928  13833  9860  93333    42760  13445  13094  89010  
 
There does not appear to be excessive multicollinearity between independent 
variables except the route market share and route HHI, which is correlated at 
0.86.  Following the recommendation of Aiken and West (1991), the mean-
centring values of route market share are used which has reduced the 
correlation between route share and route HHI to 0.01.  It should be noted that 
such rescaling has no effect on the coefficients of linear regression.  
 
                                            
6
  Correlation matrices for the models are presented in Appendix B. 
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5.2 Results of the Regression Models 
Table 5-3 reports the estimation results for the models.  Carrier-route-specific 
dummies and time dummies are omitted to conserve space.  First two columns 
in Table 5-3 report the results for Model 1 (economy – all) and Model 2 
(premium – all).  The first thing to notice is that airport dominance is more 
important than route dominance in determining an airline’s prices at the route 
level.  The coefficients of departure airport market share are highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level for both economy and premium markets.  Although 
the coefficient of route share for the premium market is significant, its 
magnitude is relatively small compared to that of airport market share (0.1609 
vs. 0.5387).  Furthermore, the coefficient of route market share for economy 
class market is statistically insignificant.  These results are consistent with the 
findings of Evans and Kessides (1993) and Hofer et al. (2008) in their study of 
the US domestic market where airport dominance plays a more important role 
than route dominance in determining airfares at the route level. However, their 
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(0.0598) (0.0790)   (0.1278) (0.0709) 
 
(0.1552) (0.0995) 




(0.0399) (0.0544)   (0.0686) (0.0490) 
 
(0.0851) (0.0711) 




(0.0367) (0.0570)   (0.0590) (0.0475) 
 
(0.0846) (0.0797) 




(0.0170) (0.0241)   (0.0261) (0.0223) 
 
(0.0329) (0.0359) 




(0.0446) (0.0603)   (0.0748) (0.0567) 
 
(0.0929) (0.0829) 




(0.0151) (0.0205)   (0.0253) (0.0190) 
 
(0.0313) (0.0279) 




(0.0107) (0.0149)   (0.0166) (0.0143) 
 
(0.0212) (0.0217) 




(0.0117) (0.0161)   (0.0221) (0.0135) 
 
(0.0269) (0.0199) 




(0.0286) (0.0401)   (0.0501) (0.0345) 
 
(0.0630) (0.0521) 
                  







 0.3646 0.1246   0.3642 0.3911   0.137 0.1359 
Notes: 1)* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
           2) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
             3) Some of observations are not used because of singleton group. 
    
It is interesting to find the coefficient of DepShare has a positive sign for 
premium market but negative sign for economy market.  More specifically, the 
results indicate that everything else being equal, when an airline’s market share 
at the four major airports increases by 1%, the airline’s premium fare would go 
up by 0.54% but its economy fare would go down by 0.2%.  The contrasting 
results between the premium and economy markets are a bit puzzling.  To 
further investigate what caused the differences, the whole dataset has been 
divided into two sub-samples based on whether the operating airline is a hub 
carrier or not.   
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The results of Model 2a (premium – hub carriers) and Model 2b (premium – 
non-hub carriers) reveal that, in the premium market, if a hub carrier increases 
its market share by 1%, on average, it is able to charge 0.92%  higher ticket 
prices on the route.  Non-hub carriers are also able to raise their prices by 
0.39%.  In other words, hub carriers have much greater ability to translate 
airport dominance into pricing power than non-hub carriers. 
 
Model 1a (economy – hub carriers) and Model 1b (economy – non-hub carriers) 
tell a different story.  The coefficient of DepShare is insignificant, indicating 
increasing market share at the hub does not allow a hub carrier charge a price 
mark-up to the economy class passengers.  However, DepShare in Model 1b is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that 1% increase of 
market share at a major airport reduces a non-hub carrier’s economy class fare 
by 0.21%. 
   
It is important to understand the relationship between airport market share and 
airline pricing.  On the one hand, higher market share may lead to increased 
market power for a hub carrier by controlling scarce airport resources to raise 
entry barrier for other carriers and making its FFPs more attractive, hence  
increasing its ability to charge higher price.  On the other hand, higher airport 
market share help an airline achieve the economies of scale, thus reducing the 
airline’s operating costs, hence providing the room for price reduction.  
Consequently, in the premium market, since most passengers are not sensitive 
to the price, hub carriers may take advantage of their market dominance to 
charge price mark-ups. The high fares charged by hub carriers may allow non-
hub carriers to increase prices but at a slightly lower level. While in the 
economy market, most passengers are likely to be sensitive to the price, hub 
carriers may choose to maintain their price level while the fringe competitors 
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may have to charge lower fares to attract passengers in order to gain a foothold 
at those highly concentrated major airports (Brueckner et al., 1992).  
 
Having discussed the effects of hub airport on airline pricing, does dominating a 
regional airport make a difference?  Our estimation results reveal that regional 
airports do not play an important role in determining the price.  The coefficients 
of regional airport share (ArrShare) for non-hub carriers in both economy and 
premium markets are negative and significant.  The results show that on a route 
linking a major hub and a regional airport, non-hub carriers do not possess any 
market power at the regional airport for either economy or premium market.  For 
hub carriers, the coefficient of ArrShare is positive and significant at 5% level for 
economy market but it is insignificant for premium market.  As presented in 
Table 5-2, hub carriers, on average, had a market share of 43% at the hub 
airport, much higher than that of non-hub carriers’ market share, which stood at 
12-14%.  However, there is almost no difference between hub carriers and non-
hub carriers in their average market share at the regional airport (i.e. the other 
endpoint of the route) – all are around 26%.  These results indicate that in such 
hub – regional route market, only when a major airport is dominated by the hub 
carrier, increasing market share at regional airports enables an airline to raise 
up the price.  Such results indicate that dominating a major airport is far more 
important than dominating a regional airport in terms of the impact on airline’s 
pricing power. 
  
Similar conclusions are drawn from the results of airport concentration variables.  
The effects of departure airport HHI (DepHHI) on airfares are all positive.  All 
the coefficients, except for Model 2b (non-hub carriers in the premium market) 
of DepHHI are statistically significant at 1% level.  The results indicate that the 
departure airport concentration has positive effects on airfares, implying that 
airlines at hub airports may tend to collude with each other to raise the prices; 
the effects on prices are stronger for hub-carriers than non-hub carriers.  By 
contrast, the coefficient for ArrHHI is only significant in Model 1a, but the 
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magnitude is relatively small, indicating that the arrival airport HHI has little 
effect on prices at the route level.  Given the fact that HHI is generally higher at 
regional airports than at hub airports (see Table 5-3 for details), apparently, 
airlines are not able to take advantages of concentration at regional airports to 
raise up price at route level.  The results further confirm our previous findings 
that airport dominance at hub airports is crucial for an airline to exercise pricing 
power. 
 
Finally, it is worth reporting that income and population variables are significant 
in most model specifications.  The sign of the variables is positive in some 
models but negative in others.  As what I discussed in Chapter 4, on the one 
hand, higher incomes and more population may have positive effects on 
demand and fares by raising the propensity for air travel in a market.  On the 
other hand, higher demand leads to the use of larger aircraft, thus reducing unit 
operating costs, hence giving airlines ability to reduce fares.  Furthermore, 
higher income and dense population may attract more airlines entering the 
market, thus increasing the level of competition which may put downward 
pressure on airfares.       
 
5.3 Interpretation of fixed effects time dummies 
During the period of our sample, Chinese domestic airline industry has 
experienced dramatic changes in competition, demand and cost.  The estimates 
of quarterly dummies from 2002 to 2012 are plotted in Figure 5-1 with the first 
quarter of 2002 as the benchmark.   
 
The first thing to notice is that hub and non-hub carriers followed the same 
pattern in economy and premium class markets.  In general, prices charged by 
non-hub carriers increased at higher rates over time.  It seems rational that in 
the regulated era, competition was restricted, and prices of smaller airlines 
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other than Big Three were intentionally suppressed, hence larger adjustments 
were made.  In addition, it is observed that external shocks were well captured 
by time effects using panel data models.  Both economy and premium classes 
experienced a dramatic reduction in airfares in 2003 due to the spread of SARS 
epidemic with premium fares declining at the much faster rates than economy 
fares.  Fares also went down in the first quarter of 2008 due to global financial 
crisis but quickly recovered in the second quarter.   
 
Figure 5-1 Fixed effect time dummies 
 
Source: The author 
 
In the economy class market, during the period 2002 to 2005, fares were 
slightly higher than the benchmark quarter, i.e. the first quarter of 2002, 
reflecting airlines’ ability to increase fares following 2002 airline consolidation 
after all the variables have been controlled for.  The opening up of the domestic 
market in 2005 and the gradually deregulation of airline pricing saw a steady 
decline of the fares from 2005 to 2010. 
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In the premium market, fares were relatively stable from 2002 to 2010 except 
for the two one-off events: 2003 SARS epidemic and 2008 financial crisis.  The 
stability of the premium fares is probably because the fares were partially 
regulated.  Following the complete deregulation of the premium fares in 2010, 
airlines seemed able to increase fares, perhaps a reflection of increased market 
power following further wave of consolidation of the market.  This effect was 
also reflected in the economy class market.  Interestingly, since the third quarter 
of 2010, the evolution of both economy and premium class fares have 




This chapter started with a discussion of summary statistics.  It is worth 
highlighting that this study is based on a very large database with more than 
35,000 observations in the whole sample.  There are large variations for almost 
all variables indicating that the sample data cover a variety of different routes 
and the results could be generalised to a wide range of situations.  In the 
regression analysis, a key finding is that airport dominance is more important 
than route dominance in determining an airline’s prices at the route level.  
Furthermore, hub carriers have much greater ability to translate airport 
dominance into pricing power than non-hub carriers.  Further analysis was 
conducted to understand the time effects on airfares.  Some interesting results 





Chapter 6  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter concludes the whole thesis.  A summary of literature review is 
presented first, followed by discussions of key findings.  After that, the originality 
of the thesis and its contributions to the body of knowledge are highlighted.  
Finally, the limitations of this research are acknowledged and some thoughts on 
further research are proposed. 
 
6.1 Summary of Literature Review 
Extensive literature review on airport dominance and pricing power was 
conducted in Chapter 2.  An examination of the determinants of airline pricing 
provided a solid foundation for the following empirical analysis.  After that, 
literature on airline market power and hub premiums was reviewed.  Initially, the 
debates were focused on whether or not there existed market power in the 
airline industry.  When it came to an agreement that the market power generally 
exists, studies were evolved from simple measurement of aggregated price 
mark-ups at airport level without controlling for many other important factors, to 
research investigating the effects of market structure on airfares with a more 
comprehensive approach of how various market forces interact in determining 
airline pricing. 
 
The literature review on hub premiums was mostly based on empirical studies 
in the context of the US domestic market, however, as Tretheway and Kincaid 
(2005) pointed out that results obtained from the US studies cannot be simply 
extended to other markets given varied market structure characteristics, 
different progress of deregulation, and diverse policy environments of the airline 
markets throughout the world.  Hence, several empirical studies for European 
market were reviewed.  The results indicated that when Europe moved from 
partial to full deregulation, there were different effects of airport dominance on 
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airline pricing.  Nevertheless, unavailability of reliable fare data casts doubts on 
the validity of the results. 
 
Given the absence of reliable research outside of the US market, a study into 
the changing Chinese domestic market was particularly interesting when it is 
evolving from a tightly deregulated regime to a liberal market.  Chapter 3, thus, 
reviewed the deregulation and airline consolidation in China. After that, there 
were discussions of the development of major hub airports with particular focus 
on airport dominance and airport concentration.  The average yields of the Big 
Three at their primary airports were scrutinised.  The analysis provided initial 
support for the existence of hub premiums  
 
6.2  Summary of Key Findings  
This thesis developed fixed-effect panel data models to assess the impact of 
airport dominance on airline pricing power in the Chinese domestic market.  A 
number of interesting findings were produced in this research.  First, it has been 
found that airport dominance is the most important source of pricing power in 
the gradually deregulated Chinese domestic market.  This result is consistent 
with the findings of Evans and Kessides (1993) and Hofer et al (2008) in their 
study of the US domestic market where airport dominance plays a more 
important role than route dominance in determining airfares at the route level.     
 
Second, hub carriers have much greater ability to translate airport dominance 
into pricing power than non-hub carriers in the premium market.  This study has 
found that if a hub carrier increases its market share by 1%, on average, it is 
able to raise up the prices by 0.92% at the route level.  However, hub carriers 
are not able to translate its airport dominance to pricing power in the economy 
market, whereas non-hub carriers even have to reduce its prices as its market 
share at major airports increases. 
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Third, this research has also found that dominating a hub airport is far more 
importance than dominating a regional airport for an airline to exercise pricing 
power at the route level.  Only when a major airport is dominated by the hub 
carrier, increasing market share at the regional airport enables an airline to 
raise up the price on the major – regional airport route. 
 
6.3 Originality and Contributions of the Research  
This study has provided valuable insights into airport dominance and airline 
pricing power in the Chinese domestic market and made original contribution to 
the literature in a number of areas.  First, this study contributes to research 
methodology by using fixed-effects panel data model to control for time-
invariant, route-carrier effects.  By contrast, most of the previous studies were 
based on the analysis of cross-sectional data which is incapable of illustrating 
the effects of airport dominance and airline pricing power over time.  
Furthermore, fixed-effects panel data analysis uses carrier-route dummies, 
allowing us to capture time-invariant characteristics specific to the carrier-route 
observation such as distance, tourist routes and primary routes. 
 
Second, this study makes important theoretical contribution to aviation literature.  
In this research, markets are segmented into business class and economy class 
so that the effects of airport dominance on airline pricing power are examined in 
a meaningful manner.  The data are obtained from highly reliable sources 
including Sabre ADI and OAG which have added additional value to this 
research.  Furthermore, it provides a comprehensive analysis of sources of hub 
premiums making explicit distinction between hub and non-hub airports. 
 
Finally, this research uses China as a case study and has provided much 
needed insights into this fast growing market when it is transforming from a 
tightly controlled regime to a deregulated market.  The findings of this research 
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have important policy implications.  It suggests that in the economy market, the 
cost effect of airport dominance prevails over its market power effect, which 
may be a good sign for policy makers.  Since premium passengers represent a 
greater proportion of total passengers for hub carriers than for non-hub carriers, 
higher prices charged to premium passengers may be much more related to 
better quality of service, such as better network or higher frequency, provided 
by hub carriers other than market power.  It seems that major airlines in China 
have not abused their market power at their hub airports.  Having said that, 
regulators must remain vigilant on this issue and periodically review the market 
power of dominant airlines.  As for practitioners, they can also benefit from this 
study to understand sources of price premiums and come up with effective 
strategies to improve their competitiveness.   
 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite significant contribution made by this research, there are still a few 
limitations due to time and data constraints.  First, the quality effects of airport 
dominance have not been quantified.  This can be an interesting topic for further 
research.  Moreover, given the fact that the hubs of the Big Three are at the 
different stage of development, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
there is any difference in the effect of airport dominance on airline pricing for 
each of the four hub airports.  However, it is not able to separate the effect of 
individual hub airports due to data feature and methodological constraints.  In 
the dataset, data for the explanatory variables, particularly, DepShare and HHI 
do not vary much over time for the same hub airport.  This resulted in the failure 
to estimate the coefficients for the relevant variables in the fixed-effects models.  
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Appendix A .  Definition of Freedoms of the Air 
The freedoms of the air are a set of commercial aviation rights granting a 
country's airlines the privilege to enter and/or land in another country's airspace. 
An airline can provide aviation services in the international markets only if it can 
get the necessary air freedoms, which are included in the bilateral Air Service 
Agreements (ASAs) between its home country and the other foreign countries 
involved.  There are nine air freedoms defined as follows: 
 
First Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State or States to fly 
across its territory without landing. 
 
Second Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State or States to 
land in its territory for non-traffic purposes. 
 
Third Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State to put down, in 
the territory of the first State, traffic coming from the home State of the carrier. 
 
Fourth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State to take on, in 
the territory of the first State, traffic destined for the home State of the carrier. 
 
Fifth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State to put down and 
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to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming from or destined to a 
third State. 
 
Sixth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, of transporting, via the home State of the carrier, 
traffic moving between two other States.  
 
Seventh Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State, of transporting 
traffic between the territory of the granting State and any third State with no 
requirement to include on such operation any point in the territory of the 
recipient State, i.e. the service need not connect to or be an extension of any 
service to/from the home State of the carrier. 
 
Eighth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, of transporting cabotage traffic between two points in 
the territory of the granting State on a service which originates or terminates in 
the home country of the foreign carrier or (in connection with the Seventh 
Freedom of the Air) outside the territory of the granting State. 
 
Ninth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege of transporting cabotage 
traffic of the granting State on a service performed entirely within the territory of 
the granting State. 
 
Source: http://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx based on the Manual on 
the Regulation of International Air Transport (Doc 9626, Part 4). 
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Appendix B .  Correlation Matrices for the Models 
 
Table B-1 Correlation Matrix for Economy Class Models  
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 DepShare 
        
2 lnDepHHI 0.131 
       
3 ArrShare 0.0399 0.133 
      
4 lnArrHHI 0.0795 0.104 0.6323 
     
5 d_RouteShare* 0.3938 0 0.3147 0 
    
6 lnRouteHHI 0.1723 0.1242 0.4872 0.5825 0 
   
7 lnFreq 0.1952 0.0787 -0.0067 -0.3017 0.5425 -0.4073 
  
8 lnPop -0.0558 -0.1529 -0.1424 -0.2134 0 -0.2406 0.1652 
 
9 lnincome -0.037 0.0399 -0.2383 -0.3934 0.0001 -0.3027 0.2962 -0.0068 
*Notes: d_RouteShare represents the mean-centring transformation for RouteShare. 
 
Table B-2 Correlation Matrix for Premium Class Models  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 DepShare 
        
2 lnDepHHI 0.1111 
       
3 ArrShare -0.0249 0.115 
      
4 lnArrHHI 0.0622 0.1009 0.5423 
     
5 d_RouteShare 0.3731 0.0122 0.3163 -0.0446 
    
6 lnRouteHHI 0.1964 0.1202 0.4372 0.4978 -0.0154 
   
7 lnFreq 0.1478 0.1122 0.0786 -0.2269 0.5627 -0.3427 
  
8 lnPop -0.0583 -0.164 -0.1573 -0.2268 -0.0057 -0.231 0.1421 
 
9 lnincome -0.0493 0.041 -0.1567 -0.3331 -0.0028 -0.2356 0.2377 -0.0573 
*Notes: d_RouteShare represents the mean-centring transformation for RouteShare. 
